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Abstract 
The extent of provision of a public good often relies on social awareness and public 
support for it. This applies, in particular, to global reduction of greenhouse gases and its 
relevance for mitigating climate change. We examine the concept of “public awareness” 
by introducing a formal model that analyzes efforts to mitigate climate change in a setting 
with heterogeneous countries. In the theoretical part we examine the Nash equilibrium of 
the contribution game. The effects of awareness and economic parameters on mitigation 
efforts can be disentangled, raising the possibility of linking awareness of climate change 
with economic wealth. The second part provides some empirical observations and offers 
the rankings of countries regarding awareness for climate change, as well as an empirical 
relationship between awareness and economic wealth. 
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1. Introduction
In December 2015, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol reached an agreement 
for reducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions — after years of negotia­
tions. The outcome of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris is gene­
rally considered positive, albeit insufficient regarding the ambitious goal of lim­
iting global warming to 1.5 degrees. There seems to be some agreement among 
the scientific community that further actions are needed, in particular after 2030.1
* Corresponding author, E­mail address: sweber@mail.smu.edu
1 Cf. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf and http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/
eng/07.pdf
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The critical issues, impeding further reaching commitments so far, refer to shar­
ing the cost of this global environmental commodity among highly diverse coun­
tries. In this context, Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) requires that the mitigation and adaptation efforts be 
shared between the parties “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. If, in this 
context, we look at current efforts of various industrialized countries to mitigate 
climate change by making use of renewable energy sources (with and without 
hydroelectricity), we obtain the situation indicated in Fig. 1.
There is no clear structure detectable, not with respect to usual concepts of 
equity (cf. Ekholm et al., 2010), and not that of an “Environmental Kuznets 
Curve” (EKC) with the share of renewable energy consumption increasing with 
GDP per capita (cf. Huang et al., 2008 and Stern, 2004). The conclusion is that 
the decisions to consume energy from renewable sources depend also on other 
parameters including societal and economic variables, on geographic and cli­
matic conditions, and probably on “awareness” for climate change (cf. UNFCCC, 
2014, p. 5), whatever part of diversity this variable comprises. Interestingly, “en­
vironmental awareness” has been used in marketing and social psychology as 
a means to conceptualize environmentally friendly behavior since the late 1960s 
(cf. Soyez et al., 2009).
Of course, there are other reasons in the various countries to promote renew­
able energies, the development of new technologies, for example, or to gain more 
independence from the import of fossil fuels. However, climate change mitiga­
tion continues to play a decisive role, as emphasized in, among other sources, 
the EU­Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
(cf. EC, 2017, p. 2).
Fig. 1. Share of energy consumption from renewable sources (with and without hydropower)  
depending on GDP (2013 thousand US­$, pc, ppp) of various industrialized countries.
Source: Authors’ calculations with data from http://data.worldbank.org/ and http://www.bp.com/
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This paper therefore investigates effects of diversity on efforts to mitigate 
global warming. In particular, what role does “awareness” of climate change play 
in combination with economic variables? Should we expect a positive relation­
ship between awareness and economic wealth? What can we learn about “aware­
ness” in our model from empirical data?
As a result of the Lima Climate Change Conference in December 2014, 
the parties to the Kyoto Protocol were invited “to communicate their intended 
nationally determined contributions well in advance of the twenty-first session 
of the Conference of the Parties in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transpar­
ency and understanding of the intended nationally determined contributions” (cf. 
UNFCCC, 2014, p. 2). This implies that the decisions of the parties are to some 
extent dependent on each other. In the paper, we model this behavior by means of 
the Nash mechanism, which then reveals effects of diversity on equilibrium deci­
sion-making. The role “awareness” plays can then be investigated more clearly. 
The results obtained in this theoretical framework can be used for some empirical 
analyses regarding awareness for climate change.
The following section reviews the relevant literature, mainly with respect to 
climate change and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Thereafter, we introduce 
the model with diverse countries. Observable diversity refers mainly to GDP 
per capita and costs of renewable energy consumption. “Awareness” refers to 
not directly observable characteristics of a country. The Nash equilibrium, result­
ing from the interaction of the countries, allows some insight into the effects of 
diversity. In particular, properties of equilibrium burden sharing in its relation to 
equity and also in relation to observable characteristics can be analyzed. The then 
following section is dedicated to some empirical investigations. In particular, 
awareness will be estimated from observable data, allowing some conclusions 
concerning the dependence on observable characteristics. Some final remarks 
conclude the paper. 
2. Literature survey
The literature on the voluntary provision of public goods is abundant, cover­
ing nearly all aspects of theoretical and practical relevance (cf., for example, 
the seminal works by Samuelson, 1954; Olson, 1965, or Bergstrom et al., 1986, 
among many others). This paper is based on these basic models.
The paper by Bergstrom et al. (1986) is of particular interest because of 
a neutrality result obtained in the context of a Nash equilibrium determining 
the equilibrium contributions towards the public good. A redistribution of in­
come among contributing countries, such that no country loses more income 
than its original contribution, yields a new Nash equilibrium in which each 
country adjusts the amount of its contribution by precisely the change in its 
income — and this redistribution has no effect on the equilibrium quantities of 
the public and private goods. In our context of mitigation efforts with possibly 
different costs for producing electricity from renewable sources, a financial sup­
port of the countries with lower costs would increase total mitigation efforts 
(cf. Result 3.2). 
These basic models on the provision of public goods have been adapted to 
the environmental context in various ways (cf. the papers mentioned below). 
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Schumacher (2015), for example, introduces “beliefs” to differentiate between 
environmental optimists and pessimists. One of the results points to the “double 
deprivation” of the pessimists: they believe that an environmental shock will 
destroy more of their wealth and they are willing to contribute more towards 
prevention. 
Interest in the concept of “environmental awareness” or “environmental con­
sciousness” originated with the ecological movement in the 1960s. According 
to Soyez et al. (2009, p. 223), researchers in marketing and social psychology 
focused first on “personal characteristics, such as sociodemographic variables, 
of environmentally conscious people.” In the 1970s and 1980s environmental­
ly friendly behavior was more explained in terms of environmentally friendly 
“ attitudes” measurable by means of multi­item scales.
“Personal value orientation” as precursor of sustainable behavior was con­
sidered in a further stream of research followed by “cultural values”, which 
have been investigated for the last ten years or so (cf. again Soyez et al., 2009, 
p. 224). Of course, cultural values form the basis for cross­cultural studies on 
environmentally friendly behavior, which are — for obvious reasons — of partic­
ular interest for researchers in marketing and social psychology. In this context 
Soyez (2012) analyzes how environmentally friendly behavior is influenced by 
cultural values, how national cultural values can be linked to personal pro-envi­
ronmental behavior. In a different, but nonetheless related context, Shum tests 
relationships between outcomes of environmental policy and attitudes towards 
the environment in order “to develop a better understanding of environmen­
tal policy divergences and the mechanisms for environmental policy-making” 
(cf. Shum, 2009, p. 282).
It seems to be plausible to assume that environmental commodities are 
characterized by a relatively high­income elasticity, at least in industrialized 
and newly industrialized countries. Consequently, demand for these commod­
ities should rise, and environmental pollution should be reduced with real 
GDP per capita further increasing. The resulting functional relationship be­
tween the level of pollution and GDP per capita points to aspects of an EKC. 
If such a relationship holds for a multitude of environmental issues, an in­
creasing economic welfare would gradually help to solve local environmental 
problems. Regarding climate change, global greenhouse gas emissions will 
nonetheless continue to increase as long as sufficiently many countries raise 
their emissions. Stern and Common (2000) discuss this case for global SO2 
emissions.
In a local context, Grossman and Krueger “find no evidence that environmen­
tal quality deteriorates steadily with economic growth. Rather, for most indica­
tors, economic growth brings an initial phase of deterioration followed by a sub­
sequent phase of improvement. The turning points for the different pollutants 
vary, but in most cases, they come before a country reaches a per capita income 
of $8000”. Their study uses urban air pollution, the state of the oxygen regime 
in river basins, fecal contamination of river basins, and contamination of river 
basins by heavy metals as indicators (Grossman and Krueger, 1995, Abstract; 
the dollars are 1985 dollars). 
Similarly, in a context of water pollution in countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe with the indicator “biological oxygen demand” (BOD), Archibald et al. 
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(2009, Abstract), find “some evidence for the EKC hypothesis and estimate 
the per capita income turning point for industrial BOD effluents to be approxi­
mately 3800–5000 USD’’. The analysis of Stern and Common (2000) on SO2 
emissions results in an inverted­U shape function of income for a sample of high­
income countries.
However, despite these promising examples, according to Stern (2004, 
p. 1419), the EKC seems to be a hypothesized relationship between various in­
dicators of environmental pollution and GDP per capita. The concept emerged 
in the early 1990s with studies of the potential environmental impacts of 
the North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Stern provides an inter­
esting survey on “the rise and the fall of the EKC”, characterizing the EKC as 
“an essentially empirical pheno menon”, with not much support from economet­
rics (cf. Stern, 2004, p. 1420). Similarly, Huang et al. (2008, Figure 3), show 
that there seems to be no empirical evidence supporting the EKC hypothesis for 
greenhouse gas emissions.
In the last years, more and more advanced econometric techniques were em­
ployed to investigate existence or non­existence of the EKC. Fosten et al. (2012), 
for example, analyze the EKC with respect to CO2 and SO2 emissions in the UK, 
and provide a useful literature survey on the econometric methods used in this 
context. As our analysis is based on the formal equilibrium outcomes of the Nash 
mechanism, the reader interested in econometric methods regarding the EKC is 
referred to these publications (cf. also Brajer et al., 2011; He and Richard, 2010; 
Wang, 2013; Yang et al., 2015). A comprehensive survey of the EKC hypothesis 
up to the year 2004 is provided by Dinda (2004). For further results on the EKC 
among the vast literature published more recently cf., for example, Kaika and 
Zervas (2013a, 2013b), and Dong et al. (2016). 
Recently, other empirical investigations revealed interesting aspects of 
the willingness to pay for climate actions. In this context Diederich and 
Goeschl (2013, Abstract), “uncover determinants of preferences for voluntary 
climate action, such as education, the information structure among the popu­
lation, and exogenous environmental conditions.” In a similar way, Borick 
et al. (2011), and Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) study public views on cli­
mate change in the US and Canada, and in Europe and the US, respectively. 
The “European’s attitude towards climate change” has been a topic of a special 
survey of “Eurobarometer” (EC, 2008). The focus of this report was on, among 
other issues, “the extent to which citizens feel informed about climate change.” 
The results of the poll show that in about two thirds of the EU member states 
more than sixty percent of those interviewed consider global warming/climate 
change “to be the most serious problem currently facing the world as a whole” 
(cf. EC, 2008, p. 8).
Awareness regarding climate change has also been addressed in various publi­
cations. Zyadin et al. (2014), for example, investigate the perceptions regarding 
renewable energies of senior academics and early­stage researchers involved in 
renewable energy sciences. Similarly, Karytsas and Theodoropoulou (2014) ex­
amine the demographic and socioeconomic factors that determine the knowledge 
of different forms of renewable energy. 
Weber and Wiesmeth (1991a, 1991b) investigate the issue of burden sharing in 
alliances, whereas Ekholm et al. (2010) and Ringius et al. (1998) discuss equita­
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bility in the context of climate change mitigation. For more fundamental aspects 
of equitable allocations cf. Moulin (1987).
So far, the review of the literature leaves us with a somewhat unclear picture. 
On the one hand we have empirical examples of an EKC, on the other hand we 
have the investigations of Stern (2004) and the empirical results of Huang et al. 
(2008), Dong et al. (2016) and our own introductory example in Fig. 1. In order to 
clarify this situation and uncover the role of “awareness”, the following section 
introduces the assumptions of the model based on awareness for climate change, 
and derives the formal results on burden sharing in the context of mitigating cli­
mate change. Empirical investigations will thereafter illustrate the practical role 
of awareness of climate change.
3. The model
The above considerations show that there is enough room and also a certain 
necessity for explicitly introducing “awareness’’ into an economic model to 
mitigate global warming — to capture non­economic aspects of diversity among 
the countries. The first subsection presents the main assumptions of the model, 
emphasizing diversity.
3.1. Basic assumptions
The following assumptions define the relevant framework conditions of our 
model. These first assumptions characterize countries as members of a union to 
mitigate climate change, the individuals living in these countries and the relevant 
commodities. The basics of our model correspond to the model of Bergstrom 
et al. (1986).
Assumption 3.1. 
a) There is a set N = {1, …, n} of countries. N constitutes a union of countries 
pursuing the environmental goal of mitigating climate change. There are ki 
individuals in country i, i ∈ N.
b) There is one private commodity x and one public commodity y. In the con­
text considered here, x is the gross domestic product (GDP), available for 
private consumption. The public commodity y is represented by the benefits 
of contributions to renewable energies (measured through renewable energy 
consumption). 
c) Individuals in country i, i ∈ N, are characterized by the identical ini­
tial endow ment wi of the private commodity (thus, GDP per capita), and 
the identical utility function depending on consumption of the private 
commodity x and the public commodity y. For each i ∈ N, utility is given 
by the homothetic function ui (xi , y) := xi yαi with the “awareness” para­
meter αi > 0.
“Renewable energy consumption” is used as an indicator regarding efforts 
to mitigate climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This public 
commodity is provided through the employment of renewable energy sources in 
the various countries, in our case parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
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The parameter αi is closely related to the marginal rate of substitution between 
the private and the public commodity. In fact, 
MRSi (x, y) = 
uiy (x, y)
uix (x, y)
 = αi 
x
y (1)
for an arbitrary consumption bundle (x, y) ∈ IR2++. Therefore, a higher value of 
αi indicates ceteris paribus a higher “willingness to pay” for an additional unit 
of the public commodity. In this sense, the values αi, i ∈ N, can be considered as 
indicators of “awareness” for global warming (cf. also Diederich and Goeschl, 
2013), which allow a ranking of the countries.
The next assumption refers to the production possibilities of the public good, 
i.e., to the costs of producing 1 kWh of electrical energy by means of renewable 
sources. There are, of course, cost differences for the various renewable energy 
sources (cf. Fraunhofer ISE, 2013), and concrete costs depend on the combination 
of these sources, which varies a lot across countries, also due to geographic and 
climatic conditions. Moreover, advanced technologies to generate electricity from 
renewable sources are more likely to be used in industrialized countries, and costs 
will also differ due to differences in wage rates and prices for suitable lots. In order 
to estimate the costs of generating electricity from renewable sources, we use data 
on “levelized cost of electricity” (LCOE).2 We make the following assumption, 
which will be complemented with concrete numbers for LCOE in Section 4.
Assumption 3.2. In country i, i ∈ N, βi units of the private good can be turned 
into one unit of the public good. Thus, each country has access to a technology 
with constant returns to scale to produce the public commodity. βi should be 
understood as the average LCOE according to the mix of renewable sources 
applied in country i.
Then utility of, for example, individual 1 of country i, i ∈ N, can be rewrit­
ten using the contributions tjm,  j = 1, …, km, m ∈ N, of all individuals towards 
the provision of the public good:
vi (t11,…, t1k1; …; tn1,…, tnkn) :=  
= (wi – βi ti1) ∙ (t11 + … + t1k1 + … + tn1 + … + tnkn)αi = 
= xi1 yαi = ui (xi1, y) (2)
We make the following assumption with respect to the utility-maximizing be­
havior of the individuals in each country i, i ∈ N:
Assumption 3.3. Individual agents maximize utility given the actions of all 
other agents in all countries.
2 According to Fraunhofer ISE (2013, p. 36), “the method of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) makes it 
possible to compare power plants of different generation and cost structures with each other… The calculation 
of the average LCOE is done on the basis of the net present value method, in which the expenses for investment 
and the payment streams from earnings and expenditures during the plant’s lifetime are calculated based on 
discounting from a shared reference date. The cash values of all expenditures are divided by the cash values 
of power generation.”
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Although decisions on the application of renewable energy sources are often 
initiated and stimulated by governments, individual households or companies 
play an important role in this context.3 In addition, governments cannot consis­
tently and over a longer period of time neglect the preferences of the voters. This 
supports the behavioral assumptions of this model. However, it is also possible 
to assume that individual countries are the decision-makers. This leads to slightly 
different, but not structurally different results. 
We then obtain the following first order condition for individual 1 in country 
i ∈ N:
βi (t11 + … + t1k1 + … + tn1 + … + tnkn) = αi (wi – βi ti1) (3)
As the left-hand sides of these first order conditions for the individuals of country i 
are identical, the right­hand sides must be identical, too, resulting in identical equi­
librium contributions of all agents of this country. Thus ti1 = … = tiki =: ti in equi­
librium for each i ∈ N. Consequently, the first order conditions for i ∈ N can be 
rewritten as follows:
k1 t1 + … + (ki + αi ) ti + … + kn tn = αi 
wi
βi
 = αi ŵi (4)
with “real” income ŵi := 
wi
βi
 measured in kWh of electricity from renewable 
sources.
As already indicated, the Nash mechanism is certainly among the most 
prominent approaches towards describing the interactions of the countries or, 
rather, the individuals, regarding the provision of this particular public good. 
Other forms of interactions, leading to, for example, egalitarian­equivalent al­
locations or core allocations (cf. Moulin 1987, Weber and Wiesmeth 1991a), 
require a more intense cooperation among the partner countries, which, in 
general, can only be guaranteed by a supranational institution endowed with 
sufficient administrative power. There is no such institution for the cases con­
sidered here.4 
3.2. Equilibrium contributions 
In the next step, we look for the solution, the Nash equilibrium, resulting from 
these interactions via the Nash mechanism. We thereby restrict the analysis to 
the consideration of interior solutions, which are relevant in most practical situa­
tions. For all cases we use real income ŵi := wi /βi, i ∈ N. As already mentioned, 
under Assumption 3.3 the first-order conditions for an interior solution are given 
by: k1 t1 + … + (ki + αi) ti + … + kn tn = αi ŵi for each i ∈ N.
We then obtain the following proposition for the values t = (t1, …, tn ) ∈ IR2++ for 
the Nash­equilibrium. The proof of Proposition 3.1 is provided in the Appendix.
3 A good example is provided by the German “Energiewende” with a large number of private households 
and business companies using the roofs of houses or vacant lots to install equipment for the generation of 
electricity from renewable sources (cf., for example, http://energytransition.de/).
4 The apparent difficulties to agree and reliably implement a 2-degree goal demonstrate the lack of an 
appropriate supranational institution to coordinate these efforts in the context of climate change.
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Proposition 3.1. First of all, the solution t = (t1, …, tn ) ∈ IR2++ is symmetric in 
the sense that ti can be obtained from tj by replacing in tj each occurrence of 
the index j with the index i and vice versa. Moreover, t1 is given by:
t1 = [k2 (α1 α̂2 … αn ) ŵ1 – k2 (α̂1 α2 … αn ) ŵ2 + … + kn (α1 α2 … α̂n ) ŵ1 –
 – kn (α̂1 α2 … αn ) ŵn + (α1 … αn ) ŵn] / 
 / [k1 (α̂1 α2 … αn ) + … + kn (α1 … α̂n ) + (α1 α2 … αn )] (5)
with α̂i meaning that this factor has to be replaced by 1. By using 
α–i := (α1 … α̂i  … αn ) and  α– := (α1 α2 … αn ), we can simplify this expression in 
the following way:
t1 = 
k2 α–2ŵ1 – k2 α–1ŵ2 + k3 α–3ŵ1 – … + kn α–nŵ1 – kn α–1ŵn + α– ŵ1
k1 α–1 + … + kn α–n + α–
 (6)
Again, we assume that an interior solution with t1 > 0, i ∈ N, exists for the given 
constellation of the parameters.
Returning to individual equilibrium contributions tin and total equilibrium 
contributions T = k1 t1 + … + kn tn , we arrive at the following results, which 
follow immediately from Proposition 3.1 (remember that wi is given by GDPi 
per capita, i ∈ N ):
Result 3.1. A higher awareness for the public good results cet. par. in 
a higher individual contribution towards the provision of the public good. 
Similarly, a higher GDP per capita results ceteris paribus in a higher in­
dividual contribution towards the provision of the public good. Moreover, 
total contributions T increase with increasing wi of the participating coun­
tries and also with higher “awareness”, i.e., with increasing values of αi , 
i ∈ N.
The following result is a consequence of the neutrality theorem of Bergstrom 
et al. (1986) applied to our context. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Result 3.2. Assume that βi > βj  for i, j ∈ N and consider a monetary transfer 
Δ > 0 from country i to country j, such that positive contributions tiΔ and tjΔ 
continue to result in equilibrium. Then total equilibrium contributions increase: 
T Δ > T.
Next, we investigate the issue of burden sharing in this context. What can 
be said with respect to the contributions of the various countries in relation to 
the economic parameters characterizing these countries?
Let Ti := ki ti denote the total contribution of country i, i ∈ N, in equilibrium. 
Then we obtain the following result regarding burden sharing (the proof is again 
given in the Appendix):
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Theorem 3.1. For any two countries i and j in N relative burden sharing is 













 ⇔ αi ŵi ≤ αj ŵj (7)
This theorem shows first of all that proportional burden sharing (with respect 
to “real” income) for mitigating climate change is the exception, although it could 
provide a basis for an equitable or fair allocation in this context. Moulin analyzes 
theoreti cal issues of equitable allocations (cf. Moulin 1987), whereas Horstmann 
and Scholz (2011) address more practical aspects in the context of mitigating 
climate change. 
Moreover, a proportionally higher share of the burden arises not only from 
a higher GDP or GDP per capita. The effect of “awareness” has to be taken into 
account. Thus, disentangling the influences of awareness and GDP per capita, it 
is possible that despite of a high GDP per capita, a proportionally lower share of 
the burden results from a low level of awareness.
The following corollary reformulates this result and relates it to the issue of 
equity, and the empirical context of Fig. 2 below. Its proof follows immediately 
from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1 (EKC).  
Assume w. l. o. g. that w1 ≤ … ≤ wn. Then 
β1 t1
w1
  ≤ … ≤  
βn tn
wn
,  and 
β1 T1
W1




if and only if β1 α1 w1 ≤ … ≤ βn αn wn.
Thus, the question, whether the share of GDP for expenses on renewable en­
ergies increases with GDP, is in particular dependent on the level of awareness 
of climate change. Obviously, the combination of the two variables plays a role: 
a lower awareness can be compensated through a higher real GDP per capita and 
vice versa. What can be said empirically about the structures of both α and ŵ 
depending on GDP per capita?
The following section addresses these empirical issues in a basic and pre­
liminary context. In particular, the question of an increasing function α(w), will 
be investigated. These results depend critically on empirical values for LCOE, 
the levelized costs of renewable energy production, for which we have only 
rough estimates. 
4. Empirical analysis
With this empirical analysis we want to derive first estimates for the aware­
ness parameter — given the ordinal specification of our utility functions — from 
the observable data on population, GDP, and renewable energy consumption 
and the herewith associated cost estimates. In addition, in view of Corollary 3.1 
the goal is to understand the empirical relationship between awareness and GDP 
per capita. As already indicated in the introductory section, we focus on coun­
tries, which are parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
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4.1. The formal background
We investigate and evaluate the share of “Renewable Energy Consumption” in 
various countries as an indicator of awareness regarding climate change. The first 
step consists in determining roughly the values of the cost factors βi for countries 
i ∈ N in consideration, i.e., the LCOE of 1 kWh of electricity generated by means 
of renewable sources. 
There is a substantial range of costs, depending on the situation of a par­
ticular country (cost of equipment, labor costs, climatic situation, etc.) and on 
the combination of technologies to generate electricity from renewable sources 
(cf. Figure 3 in WEC, 2013, p. 11).5 However, precise data on average LCOE in 
a particular country seem not to be available so far. In order to complete our em­
pirical analysis, we thus have to make some rudimentary assumptions regarding 
the values of the βi, i ∈ N.
In order to approximate the scarcely available empirical data, we define 
the function β(w) in the following simple way: β(w):= –0.1 + 0.0000066 w. This 
leads to LCOE of approximately 0.07 US-$ per kWh for a country with a GDP 
per capita (PPP) of 25,000 US­$ (Portugal), of approximately 0.19 US­$ for 
a country with a GDP per capita (PPP) of 45,000 US­$ (Germany), and of ap­
proximately 0,26 US-$ per kWh for a country with a GDP per capita (PPP) of 
55,000 US­$ (US). β(w) then connects these pairs of coordinates by a straight 
line. The values for the βi, i ∈ N, correspond approximately to some estimates 
provided in the literature, although precise data are required for a sound analysis. 
Observe that with this specification of β(w) the function ŵ(w) := w /β(w) de­
creases with w increasing. 
If we look again at current efforts of various industrialized countries to miti­
gate climate change by making use of renewable energy sources (without hydro­
electricity), we obtain the situation indicated in Fig. 2, with the LCOE given by 
the above function β(w).
Again, there is no clear structure detectable. In particular the share of expenses 
of GDP on renewable energy consumption does not increase with GDP per capita 
(cf. also Fig. 1). Consequently, in view of Corollary 3.1, βi αi wi cannot increase 
with GDP pc = wi of these countries.
For the formal background of the empirical investigations, we consider 
the variables αi as functions of the variables (Tj, kj, wj, βj)j ∈ N. Instead of solv­
ing the expressions for the equilibrium contributions for the parameters αi, i 
∈ N, we make directly use of the first order conditions for the interior Nash 
equilibrium: 
k1 t1 + … + (ki + αi ) ti + … + kn tn = αi ŵi   for i ∈ N (8)
with “real” GDP per capita ŵ(w):= wi /βi. These equations can be rewritten 
as follows: T = αi (ŵi – ti ) with total contributions towards the provision of 
the public good, i.e., total spending on renewable energy sources, of the mem­
ber states, given by T = k1 t1 + … + kn tn. Consequently, the values of the αi, 
5 For more detailed case studies on LCOE we refer to Fraunhofer ISE (2013) for Germany, to Sargsyan et al. 
(2011) for India, and to WEC (2013) for a global energy perspective.
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ŵi – ti   
for i ∈ N (9)
The first analysis investigates climate-sensitive behavior of Annex II Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries in the OECD with self­commitments 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
4.2. Annex II countries
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
resulting from the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, divides countries 
into three main groups according to differing commitments:6
• Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of 
the OECD in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), 
including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and 
Eastern European states.
• Annex II Parties consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT 
Parties. They are required to provide financial resources to enable develop­
ing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the Convention 
and to help them adapt to adverse effects of climate change.
Table 1 presents the results for the values of GDP per capita (2013 US­$, ppp) 
and “environmental awareness” for selected Annex II Parties. The countries are 
ranked according to the values of environmental awareness. The selected coun­
tries are somewhat comparable, although not identical, regarding their economic 
development.
6 http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php
Fig. 2. Share of Expenses on Renewable Energies depending on GDP pc (2013 thousand US­$, ppp) of 
various industrialized countries.
Source: Authors’ calculations using β(w) with data from http://data.worldbank.org/ and http://www.bp.com/
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Countries with a supposedly high environmental awareness (Norway, 
Switzerland, US, Sweden) lead this list of Annex II countries. The only surprise 
is that the Southern European countries Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece with 
a lot of sunshine appear towards the lower end of the ranking.
Observe that in this table we do not include consumption of electricity from 
hydro power plants, as the availability of hydroelectricity is largely dependent on 
appropriate geographical conditions. Nevertheless, the abundance of hydroelec­
tricity in some countries might affect consumption of electricity from the other 
renewable sources. This might in turn have an effect on the empirical value of 
“awareness”, not taken into account in the above estimations (cf., however, Fig. 3).
4.3. The empirical relationship between awareness and economic wealth
One of the prominent questions arising in this context refers to the relationship 
between awareness of climate change and GDP per capita. More precisely, this is 
Table 1
Ranking of Annex II Parties regarding “awareness”. 
Country  GDPpc αi  Country  GDPpc αi
Norway 66,520 0.407  Switzerland 56,580 0.386
US 53,960 0.380  Sweden 44,760 0.352
Denmark 44,460 0.351  Germany 44,540 0.350
Austria 43,840 0.346  Netherlands 43,210 0.343
Canada 42,610 0.340  Australia 42,540 0.340
Belgium 40,280 0.330  Finland 38,480 0.322
Japan 37,630 0.315  France 37,580 0.314
UK 35,760 0.304  Ireland 35,090 0.300
Italy 34,100 0.293  Spain 31,850 0.277
New Zealand 30,750 0.269  Greece 25,630 0.215
Portugal 25,360 0.213   
Note: Values of the αi for readability multiplied with factor 100.
Source: Authors’ calculations with data taken from http://data.worldbank.org/ and http://www.bp.com/
Fig. 3. Awareness depending on GDP pc (2013 thous. US­$, ppp) of  
the Annex II countries listed in Table 1 with β(w).
Source: Authors’ calculations with data from http://data.worldbank.org/ and http://www.bp.com/
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the question, whether this relationship reveals aspects of an EKC (cf. Stern, 2004; 
Huang et al. 2008; Kaika and Zervas, 2013a, 2013b; Dong et al., 2016). Fig. 3 
presents the result based on the LCOE function β(w):= –0.1 + 0.0000066 w for 
renewable energies with and without hydropower.
There is, thus, a rather clear tendency for higher environmental awareness to be 
associated with a higher GDP per capita. This result is in favor of the upward slop­
ing part of a classical EKC, implying that activities for mitigating climate change 
increase with economic wealth. However, the results do not point to a classical EKC.
We know from Corollary 3.1 that the behavior of βi  αi  wi determines 
the  behav ior of βi ti /wi = βi Ti /Wi = βi Ti /GDPi, i ∈ N. In this sense, the empiri­
cal curve α(w) from Fig. 3 and the downward sloping function ŵ(w) “explain” 
the structure of Fig. 2. Although awareness shows an increasing trend, this posi­
tive effect is more than compen sated through the negative income effect result­
ing from the decreasing “real” income. 
5. Concluding remarks
The theoretical part of this paper analyzes the interaction of the agents of 
various countries regarding efforts to mitigate climate change. These efforts are 
measured by renewable energy consumption and the interaction is governed by 
the Nash mechanism. The results demonstrate the influence of “awareness”, in 
addition to the economic variable “GDP per capita” on burden sharing.
The empirical part of the paper makes use of the first-order conditions to 
allow an explicit computation of the awareness parameters for various coun­
tries. The results are dependent on the levelized costs of energy from renewable 
sources, for which there are only more or less rough estimates. The estimates of 
LCOE applied here lead to aspects of an empirical EKC for awareness of climate 
change. 
Future research in this context could focus on this more or less latent variable 
“awareness”. Which parameters influence awareness, and how could awareness 
be raised in order to accelerate efforts to mitigating climate change. However, it is 
also necessary to improve the empirical analysis through a more careful estimate 
of the levelized costs of energy from renewable sources. So far, the estimates 
available in the literature are rather imprecise and incomplete. 
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: For the proof we note that the system of first or­
der conditions is symmetric in the sense that symmetrically exchanging indices 
leads from one equation to the other ones. Therefore, this property is retained for 
the solutions. Next, we show that the first one of these first order conditions is 
fulfilled by plugging in the above values of ti. This equation reads:
(k1 + α1 ) ti + k2 t2 + … + kn tn = α1 ŵ1 (A1)
From straightforward calculations we immediately obtain the following ex­
pression for the total quantity of the public commodity T = k1 t1 + … + kn tn pro­
vided in equilibrium:
T  =  
(α1 … αn ) (k1ŵ1 + … + kn ŵn )
k1(α̂1 … αn ) + … + kn (α1 … α̂n ) + (α1 … αn )
  = 
=  
k1 α– ŵ1 + … + kn α– ŵn
k1 α–1 + … + kn α–n + α–
  =  
k1ŵ1 + … + kn ŵn
k1 /α1 + … + kn /αn + 1
 (A2)
Thus, it remains to show: T + α1 t1 = α1ŵ1. Canceling out α1 and rearranging 
the terms by means of the above formula we obtain:
( Tα1 + t1 ) (k1 α–1 + … + kn α–n + α–) = k1 α–1ŵ1 + … + kn α–1ŵn +
+ k2 α–2ŵ1 – k2 α–1ŵ2 + k3 α–3ŵ1 + … + kn α–nŵ1 – kn α–1ŵn + α– ŵ1 = 
= k1 α–1ŵ1 + … + kn α–1ŵn + α–  ŵ1 = ŵ1(k1 α–1 + … + kn α–n + α–) (A3)
and the desired result follows. By making use of symmetry considerations, 
the other equations are also fulfilled with these values of the ti, i ∈ N.
Proof of Result 3.2: For a total monetary transfer Δ from country i to coun­
try j each individual has to contribute the amount Δ/ki and each individual of 
country j obtains the amount Δ/kj. Consider then
T  =  
k1ŵ1 + … + kn ŵn 
k1 /α1 + … + kn /αn + 1
 (A4) 
from the proof of Proposition 3.1 above. We can similarly calculate T Δ and inves­
tigate the difference to T by focussing on the relevant terms:
T Δ – T  =  
ki (ŵi – Δ/(ki βi) ) + kj (ŵj + Δ/(kj βj) ) – ki ŵi – kj ŵj
k1 /α1 + … + kn /αn + 1
  = 
=  
– Δ/βi + Δ/βj
k1 /α1 + … + kn /αn + 1
 (A5)
But this last expression is positive for βi > βj.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1: In order to simplify the notation, we compare t1ŵ2 
with t2ŵ1. A straightforward calculation using real GDP and the nominators of 
the above terms yields:
t1ŵ2  ≤  t2ŵ1 ⇔
k2 α–2ŵ1ŵ2 – k2 α–1ŵ22 + … + kn α–nŵ1ŵ2 – kn α–1ŵ2ŵn + α–  ŵ1ŵ2 ≤ 
k1 α–1ŵ1ŵ2 – k1 α–2ŵ12 + … + kn α–nŵ1ŵ2 – kn α–2ŵ1ŵn + α–  ŵ1ŵ2 (A6)
Simplifying and substituting Ŵi for ki ŵi, i ∈ N, yields: 
t1ŵ2  ≤  t2ŵ1  ⇔ (Ŵ1 + … + Ŵn)  α–2ŵ1 ≤ (Ŵ1 + … + Ŵn)  α–1ŵ2 
 ⇔  α–1ŵ1 ≤ α–2ŵ2 (A7)
thus, arriving at the desired result.
